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Abstract
Using evolutionary game theory, I consider how guilt can provide individual
fitness benefits to actors both before and after bad behavior. This supple-
ments recent work by philosophers on the evolution of guilt with a more
complete picture of the relevant selection pressures.
1 Introduction
Moral emotions, such as shame and guilt, are deeply important to human moral behav-
ior. Although few ethicists think the ‘is’ of evolved moral emotions should be directly
translated to an ‘ought’ of ethical imperative, evidence from psychology and biology has
increasingly made clear that at very least a full picture of human ethics must take these
emotions into account.
This paper will focus on the evolution of guilt specifically. The goal is to provide
an analysis of how guilt can be individually beneficial to actors, drawing on extensive
literature from evolutionary game theory regarding the evolution of prosocial behavior. In
this way, work by philosophers on the evolution of guilt (like that of Joyce (2007), Deem
and Ramsey (2015), and Ramsey and Deem (2015)) can be supplemented by a more
detailed picture of the relevant evolutionary pressures. As I will show, this literature
suggests a number of ways that guilt can provide individual fitness benefits, both by
preventing transgression in the first place, and by leading to reparative behaviors after
transgression. In an attempt to better understand this latter role of guilt, I present novel
modeling work on the evolution of apology.
In section 2, I discuss guilt in humans focusing on how it influences behavior. In
section 3, I describe how evolutionary game theory can be used to inform the evolution
of emotion. In section 4, I use evolutionary game theoretic models to shed light on the
evolution of guilt.
2 The Role of Guilt in Behavior
Since this paper aims to connect insights from evolutionary game theory to the evolution
of guilt, I will focus here on the behaviors guilt induces in humans, rather than the
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psychology behind it. This is because, as will be elaborated in section 3, game theoretic
models represent agents through behavior.
Guilt is a negative emotion focused on one’s past behavior, and, in particular, on
social transgression (Tangney et al. 1996). Guilt seems to shape human behavior in two
ways. First, the anticipation of experiencing guilt can influence actors’ choices as to
whether to commit a transgression. Empirical work demonstrates that guilt proneness
in humans decreases the likelihood of social transgression (Svensson et al. 2013), and
increases prosocial behavior, including altruism and cooperation (Malti and Krettenauer
2013; Regan 1971; Ketelaar and Tung Au 2003). Secondly, the actual experience of
guilt after committing a transgression can lead to confession and to reparative behaviors
like apology, gift giving, acceptance of punishment, and self punishment (Silfver 2007;
Ohtsubo and Watanabe 2009; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). Expressions of guilt also
influence the behavior of interactive partners. Actors who express remorse are more likely
to be judged guilty of committing a crime (Bornstein et al. 2002; Jehle et al. 2009), but
their punishments tend to be reduced (Gold and Weiner 2000; Fischbacher and Utikal
2013; Eisenberg et al. 1997).
3 Modeling the Evolution of Guilt
Evolutionary game theory considers the evolution of strategic behavior in populations.
Games—mathematical models of strategic interactions—are usually defined by three
things: players, or actors in the game, strategies, the things actors can do, and payoffs,
outcomes for the actors. One further game theoretic concept that must be introduced is
that of Nash equilibrium—a set of strategies where no player can deviate and improve
her payoff. Because no one wants to switch from a Nash equilibrium, these strategies are
thought of as stable and are often evolutionarily significant.
Evolutionary game theorists employ what are called dynamics to games—rules that
determine population change as a function of the payoffs actors receive. The replicator
dynamics are the most commonly used model of evolutionary change in evolutionary
game theory, and they will be the primary dynamics employed here. They assume that
strategies that garner good payoffs will proliferate in a population while those that do
not will tend to die out.
Evolutionary game theory deals with the evolution of behavioral traits in a social
context, and has previously focused on prosociality, making this methodology an appro-
priate one to study the evolution of guilt (which, as mentioned, is often associated with
prosocial behavior). This said, emotions simpliciter are not behaviors, and evolutionary
game theoretic models represent actors through behaviors. What one can do is to model
the evolution of a behavior associated with a particular emotion, show that this behavior
is a successful one, and then argue that this may explain the evolution of said emotion. A
tendency towards certain emotional states, then, is selected for by dint of causing certain
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types of behaviors.1
The prisoner’s dilemma models two agents who may choose either to cooperate with
each other or to ‘defect’. While defection is better for the individual, two defectors do
poorly in comparison to two cooperators. This seems to capture the strategic charac-
ter of many real world human interactions—cooperation provides benefits to interactive
partners, but it is also beneficial to take advantage of others. Figure 1 shows a typical
prisoner’s dilemma. The rows and columns model the choices—cooperate or defect—of
the two interactive partners. Each cell in the chart represents one possible outcome with
payoffs to the row actor listed first and column second. The unique Nash equilibrium of
the game is Defect v Defect.
Figure 1: A payoff table for the prisoner’s dilemma.
The stag hunt is a model of cooperation under risk. Suppose that two hunters can
either choose to hunt for hare, or for stag. Taking down a stag is preferable because it
provides more meat. But two hunters are needed to hunt stag, whereas a solo hunter can
catch a hare. For this reason, stag hunting is risky. If one interactive partner does not
choose to cooperate, the solo stag hunter gets nothing. The payoff table for this game is
shown in figure 2. The Nash equilibria are Hare v Hare and Stag v Stag. The stag hunt
may seem like a sub-ideal model for guilt, as there is no temptation to defect against a
cooperator. In real world stag hunts, though, humans may be tempted in the moment
to hunt hare (i.e., lazing around instead of building that shelter) and in such cases moral
emotions, like guilt, might influence behavior.
4 Models
I will now look at evolutionary models that employ these two games in an attempt to
understand how guilt can provide fitness benefits to individuals. This discussion will be
divided into two parts. First, I consider how guilt can provide individual fitness benefits
by preventing antisocial behavior both in the stag hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma. The
1This method is similar to the ‘indirect evolutionary approach’, where actors evolve preferences that
lead them to behave in ways that are beneficial overall, though they may be detrimental in a narrow
interactive context (Gu¨th 1995). I do not use this method because while emotions shape preferences,
they also influence behavior in other ways (by creating states of arousal, for example).
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Figure 2: A payoff table for the stag hunt.
second part considers whether guilt can provide individual fitness benefits by helping
actors re-enter the social fold after behaving badly. Note that there is a very large
literature on the evolution of prosocial behavior—here I point to the most relevant results
from this literature, but do not attempt a survey.2
4.1 Guilt Before Defection
As discussed in section 2, empirical results indicate that guilt can influence human behav-
ior by helping prevent failures of cooperation before they occur. If guilt is an underlying
trait that leads to cooperation, any model where cooperative behavior provides individual
benefit is a model where guilt could do so as well.
In the Stag Hunt
Suppose a population plays a stag hunt and that some significant proportion of the
population plays stag (cooperates) when interacting with another agent. In such a case,
any trait that promotes the choice of stag (cooperation) will benefit an individual agent.
The reason for this is that each actor is more likely to meet a stag hunter than a hare
hunter and if this occurs, the actor does best to choose to hunt stag as well. In such a
scenario, the evolution of cooperation is not particularly mysterious, and neither is the
evolution of any trait that promotes cooperation. Cooperation directly benefits fitness,
with no further structure to the model (Skyrms 2004).
If one assumes that the ancestral state for early humans was a lack of cooperation,
the stag hunt model seems less helpful. In a population where all actors are hunting
hare, there is no individual incentive to hunt stag, and underlying traits that lead to
more stag hunting will not be selected for. Mechanisms that lead to stag hunting from
such a state have been investigated, however. Social structure, as modeled by interaction
with neighbors in a social network, can allow cooperation to emerge in the stag hunt
2I ignore work on other games of cooperation. Discussions of group and kin selection models for
prosocial behavior are outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on individual selection.
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due to individual benefits as can the ability of actors to coordinate behavior with signals
(Skyrms 2004; Alexander 2007). In these cases, an emotion like guilt that promotes
prosocial behavior is directly beneficial.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The key to evolving cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma is correlated interaction (Axel-
rod and Hamilton 1981; Hamilton 1963). If cooperators meet cooperators, and defectors
meet defectors in the prisoner’s dilemma, two outcomes of the game—Cooperate v Coop-
erate and Defect v Defect—become more important than the rest. As figure 3 illustrates,
if actors always (or often) meet their own types, it becomes beneficial to cooperate rather
than to defect.
Figure 3: A payoff table for a prisoner’s dilemma with correlated interaction.
Many mechanisms have been proposed whereby correlated interaction can occur in
the prisoner’s dilemma. Most of these fall under the broad categories of kin selection,
group selection, indirect or direct reciprocity, and network reciprocity (Nowak 2006).
Reciprocity can shape selective scenarios so that cooperation is individually beneficial.3
If an actor in the right reciprocity type scenario switches to defection, he or she will
no longer continue to meet cooperative partners, making cooperation (and thus guilt)
individually beneficial.
In Response to Punishment
It should be noted that there is something a bit funny about the discussion just provided.
Guilt, at least in modern humans, is evoked when actors break norms. In the models
above, I suppose that guilt is evolving because it is tied to cooperative behavior before
there are normative expectations for this behavior. The results above, then, are better
thought of as applying to something like proto-guilt.
3Under group selection cooperators meet cooperators and so evolve, but in any particular case switch-
ing strategies to defect will be individually beneficial. Ditto for cases of network reciprocity. In kin se-
lection, cooperation is individually beneficial from an inclusive fitness standpoint, but I do not consider
inclusive fitness here.
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The evolution of normative punishment has been supported by evolutionary models
(Boyd et al. 2003; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Okamoto and Matsumura 2000). More
importantly, for our discussion, it is an empirical fact that humans punish norm violators
(Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1994). In a population that punishes defectors,
defection becomes individually costly. Any trait, such as guilt proneness, that prevents
accidental defection (or decreases temptation to defect on the part of the individual) will
provide an individual selective advantage in such a social environment (Boyd et al. 2003;
Boyd and Richerson 2009).
4.2 Guilt After Defection
I now turn to the question of whether guilt can provide individual fitness benefits to
actors who have already defected. As discussed in section 2, in these cases guilt seems to
harm individual actors by leading to confession and an increased chance of being caught,
as well as to costly reparative behaviors and punishment. On the other hand, it can
lead to apology and forgiveness, and to decreased punishment from other individuals.
I explore the possibility that guilt is actually beneficial in such cases because it allows
future potential partners to recognize underlying cooperative tendencies despite recent
anti-social behavior and so forgive guilt prone types.
Costly Apology
The evolutionary game theoretic literature on behavior after defection focuses on a game
called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). In this game, two agents play the standard
prisoner’s dilemma some number of times.4 Strategies in this game include choices like
the well studied ‘grim trigger’ (GT)—cooperate until my partner defects, and defect
after that. Players may also just choose to cooperate unconditionally (C) or defect
unconditionally (D). Another strategy that has been widely considered in this game is
tit-for-tat (TFT) where actors cooperate on the first round of interaction and after that
copy whatever their interactive partner did the round before.
This literature also commonly employs models where actors sometimes err. For ex-
ample, an actor may be inclined towards unconditional cooperation, but defect in each
round with some probability. This aspect of the model captures the idea that otherwise
prosocial individuals may behave badly by accident, because of temptation, or due to
exigencies of a particular situation.
Both GT and TFT are strategies where actors correlate interaction through reci-
procity. In both of these strategies, actors will tend to cooperate with other cooperators
and defect with other defectors, and for this reason both strategies can be evolutionarily
4Or else they play it for an unspecified length of time where at each round there is some probability
that the game ends.
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successful in the IPD (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 2000). Both strategies, how-
ever, have problems when their interactive partners are prone to error. Suppose two GTs
are playing the IPD and one accidentally defects. Her partner will immediately enter
a state of permanent defection, and she will likewise do so. If two actors playing TFT
interact, and one accidentally defects, the partner will defect, causing the original defec-
tor to defect again, and so on. In these cases although both actors are cooperative, they
enter a spiral of defection where they lose payoff (Nowak 2006).5 On an intuitive level,
it makes sense that retaliation is useful as a way to punish and avoid bad cooperative
partners. But, as these results suggest, it is good to have a way out of retaliation.
Theorists have attempted to solve this problem through the introduction of apology
to these games (Okamoto and Matsumura 2000; Han et al. 2013; Ohtsubo and Watanabe
2009; Ho 2012). In apologetic strategies, actors who are otherwise cooperatively inclined,
but defect through error, apologize to their interactive partners and are readmitted to
the social fold. One necessity for these apologizing strategies to be stable in a population
is that the apologizers pay a cost either directly or through punishment (Han et al. 2013;
Okamoto and Matsumura 2000). These costs are necessary to prevent the invasion of
‘faker’ strategies where one apologizes, is readmitted to the social fold, and continues to
defect. If apology bears a cost, it will not be worthwhile for fakers to apologize because
the benefits of defecting again in the next round will not be high enough. For those with
cooperative intent, the costly apology is worth paying in exchange for a long, fruitful
cooperative interaction.6
Given these results, it is striking that after defection guilt in humans leads to a suite
of behaviors—reparation, a willingness to accept punishment, and self punishment—that
are individually costly. This points at a way that guilt, perhaps surprisingly, provides
individual fitness benefits. Guilt prone types provide costly signals of their cooperative
intent that would not be worthwhile to send unless they actually wanted to continue to
cooperate in the future.
Cost-Free Apology
While this literature seems to shed light on the function of guilt after defection, the mod-
els discussed do not perfectly match empirical observations. As discussed, expressions of
guilt tend to lead to decreased punishment by group members rather than increased pun-
ishment. Note that for guilt prone types in the models just discussed, if their interactive
5There are a number of TFT variants that avoid this issue (Wu and Axelrod 1995; Nowak and Sigmund
1992; Nowak et al. 1993). Apology strategies can be thought of as alternatives to these solutions to the
retaliation problem.
6Experimental evidence indicates that humans indeed make costly apologies and that these are more
successful than cost free ones in many cases (Ohtsubo and Watanabe 2009; Ho 2012; Nelissen 2012).
Guilt may play a role in motivating costly apology (Ohtsubo and Watanabe 2009).
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partners could trust their apologies without exacting some cost, this would obviously be
preferable.
There is a literature in evolutionary game theory on this sort of trustworthy signal
of cooperative intent. For example, Robson (1990) uses models to show that if actors
can establish a ‘secret handshake’, a behavioral signal correlated with a tendency to
cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation can evolve. Of course, these signals are
vulnerable to fakers in the same way cost-free apologies are vulnerable to fakers. Frank
(1988, 1987) argues that moral emotions, such as guilt, can be thought of as a special
sort of signal of cooperative intent because moral emotions are, in fact, correlated with
cooperative behavior, and, Frank argues, are difficult to employ for non-cooperators.
Frank focuses on one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas where actors use signals of emotion
to choose cooperative partners in the first place. But this also seems to point to a way
that guilt could be individually beneficial after defection. Perhaps actors can use honest
signals of guilt to convince wronged partners of their future cooperative intent without
paying some cost to guarantee it.
Consider an IPD where actors play for some number of rounds, n. During each
round, an actor errs with probability α. Consider the following available strategies:
unconditional cooperation (C), unconditional defection (D), grim trigger (GT), tit for
tat (TFT), and guilt prone versions of either TFT or GT. In a guilt prone grim trigger
(GPGT), actors behave like grim triggers, but after each defection they apologize. They
also accept apologies and continue to cooperate with others who send them. This means
that in practice, when guilt prone types meet they behave as unconditional cooperators.
For now, I assume it is impossible to fake these apologies, because they are guaranteed
by emotional signals.
I consider replicator dynamics simulations both of populations where actors can play
C, D, GT, or GPGT and where actors can play C, D, TFT, or GPTFT.7 Under all
parameter values considered (α = .01, .05 and n = 10, 100), GP types were by far the
most likely to evolve. For very low n, D types evolve, and in all runs of models with TFT
and GPTFT, population states with a combination of TFT and C sometimes evolve.8 In
other words, when it can act as an honest signal of apology, guilt evolves. This result is
robust even when signals of guilt are not always trusted by recipients, and when guilty
types are more likely to be caught defecting than other types.
The results just presented, however, are not entirely convincing. As Deem and Ramsey
(2015) point out, guilt does not seem to fit well into Frank’s picture of moral emotions
7The discrete time replicator dynamics, employed here to generate simulation results, are formulated
as x′i = xi(
fi(x)∑n
j=1 fj(x)xj)
) where xi is the proportion of a population playing strategy i, fi(x) is the fitness
of type i in the population state x and
∑n
j=1 fj(x)xj is the average population fitness in this state.
8For more details on any of the simulations presented in this paper, and related simulations, please
contact the author.
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as reliable indicators of cooperative intent. Unlike many other emotions, guilt is not
associated with stereotypical facial expressions or body positions. But, on the other
hand, humans do spend effort signaling their guilt verbally. And there is evidence that
humans are, at least to some degree, able to ‘read’ the cooperative intent of others (Brosig
2002; Frank et al. 1993). In other words, the pictures of guilt leading to costly-apology
or to cost-free apology do not seem to entirely fit. In the next section, I discuss an
intermediate possibility that may help.
Low Cost Apology
Huttegger et al. (2015) point out that the distinction between cases where signals are
trustworthy because they are costly (like costly apology), and cases where signals are
trustworthy because only certain types of senders are able to generate them (like unfake-
able emotional signals) is a spurious one. These authors show that even if a signal is
only somewhat hard to fake, this can decrease the necessary costs that those employing
this signal must pay to guarantee that it is genuine.9 This work may help unify the two
ways discussed that signals of guilt can be trustworthy, and so help account for empirical
observations of guilt after defection.
Again, consider an IPD where actors sometimes err. Suppose that actors can be C,
D, GT, or GPGT.10 Lastly, suppose that faker types (F) exist who act like defectors but
are able to send signals of guilt. When GPGT types receive these signals from faker
types, they forgive the fakers and continue to cooperate.
Assume the following: actors pay a cost, C, to attempt to signal their guilt, and
even when such attempts are made, they are not always successful. Also assume that
because GP types really do experience guilt, the probability that they are successful when
signaling their guilt, PGP , is generally higher than the probability that fakers successfully
signal, PF . In these models, as PF decreases, the signal cost to ensure that fakers cannot
invade a guilt prone population also decreases. In other words, even if signals of guilt
are only somewhat trustworthy, this can change the level of punishment or reparation
needed for apology to work. Figure 4 demonstrates this for games where α = .05 and
n = 10 or n = 100. This result holds as long as n is not too low and α is not too high.11
Suppose that instead of sometimes failing to signal, faker types experience a higher
9I am equivocating a little bit here. Huttegger et al. (2015) are referring to cases where a difference
in signal cost between high and low types ensures that only high types send the signal. In the costly
apology literature, costs for apologies are generally the same for fakers and non-fakers, but non-fakers get
a greater benefit for signaling, meaning there is still a discrepancy in the signal benefit for the different
types.
10I did not consider TFT in this case for simplicity sake, but there is reason to think the results should
extend to TFT and GPTFT.
11To be more precise, for each PF this figure shows the lowest cost C such that GPGT remains an
ESS of the game.
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Figure 4: Costs necessary to stabilize populations of GP types against invasion by F
types as the probability that F types successfully signal their guilt (PF ) drops.
direct cost when signaling their guilt. Because their verbal assertions of guilt are less
convincing, they must spend more effort on reparative behavior, or accept greater pun-
ishments from group members to successfully signal. In the models at hand, this small
change in believability also can stymie faker types.12
The take-away is that guilt after defection may function either as an honest signal of
cooperative intent, as a mechanism leading to costly signals of cooperative intent, or as
something in between. This in-between area seems to fit best with empirical observations
of guilt.
5 Conclusion
It should be noted that these models do not explicitly account for the important role
of cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution in the evolution of guilt (Chudek and
Henrich 2011; Henrich and Henrich 2006). This reservation noted, the models described
give a broad set of cases where guilt might be individually selected for, whether or
not the selective environment was shaped by culture and whether or not guilt itself is
culturally created. Also, the work here involves limited runs of simulations, rather than
more detailed analysis of the parameter space of these models, and so should be taken
12In models where GPGT and F types pay equal costs, GPGT generally has a small basin of attraction
for the replicator dynamics. This is because F types still do fairly well against GPGT types and then D
types outperform them. When F types pay higher costs than GPGT types, the basin of attraction for
GPGT can be very large.
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to indicate possible benefits for guilt rather than something deeper. Rosenstock and
O’Connor (2015) are exploring similar analytic results, with similar outcomes.
Although an emotion like guilt may seem to be mainly group-beneficial13, there are
a number of plausible selective environments in which guilt, or something like it, can be
individually beneficial in evolutionary settings. These selective environments, involving
reciprocity, punishment, and apology, fit well with our empirical picture of human so-
cieties. As this paper illustrates, guilt may have adapted (or exapted) to play different
roles in a complex and multifaceted developing human social environment.
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